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Abstract: 
It was 21 January 2000, only a few months into the Second Chechen War, when Vladimir Putin, 
acting president of the Russian Federation, stated that “neither today nor in the near future will 
the intensity of the information battle lessen, either inside the country or abroad.” Of central 
importance to this information battle was the fight to define Chechen identity. Throughout the 
Second Chechen War the Russian government, Chechen rebels, Chechen civilians, and 
journalists sought to define who Chechens were in order to further their own various goals. 
During the war, Chechens were labeled with many conflicting identities. They were alternately 
identified as dangerous criminals and terrorists, separatists, normal people, and helpless victims. 
I argue that the Russian government’s label of Chechens as dangerous won this war and had the 
greatest impact on the daily lives of Chechen civilians. 
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Introduction 
It was January 2000, only a few months into the second Chechen war, when Vladimir 
Putin, acting president of the Russian Federation, stated that “neither today nor in the near future 
will the intensity of the information battle lessen, either inside the country or abroad.”1 This 
information battle was of central importance during the second Chechen war as throughout the 
war, a battle of words was fought between the Russian government, Chechen rebels, Chechen 
civilians, and the media to portray who Chechens, as a people, were. Chechens were alternately 
portrayed as dangerous, separatists, normal, and helpless. I argue that the picture of Chechens as 
dangerous had the greatest impact and negatively affected how Chechens were viewed during the 
war.  
 
The Russian Government’s Information Battle  
It is necessary to situate portrayals of Chechen identity within the scope of the 
information battle conducted by the Russian government during the second Chechen War. This 
information battle consisted of many players, the most notable ones being the Russian 
government, the media, Chechen rebels, and Chechen non-combatants. It was launched by the 
Russian government in order to gain the support of Russian citizens for the second war in 
Chechnya. The government could not risk the war being portrayed in a manner that would boost 
support for the Chechen rebels or that would make the government or the military look bad. 
Because of this, the information battle largely consisted of the government seeking to control and 
filter all of the available information on the war. Their efforts often took the form of controlling 
media coverage of the war. Thus, journalists and human rights organizations faced many 
                                                          
1 Vladimir Putin, “Opening Remarks at a Meeting of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Board,” President of Russia, 
January 21, 2000, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21505. 
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obstacles in reporting on the war and often the only information available on events was what the 
Russian government allowed.  
Russian and foreign journalists were often prevented from gathering information on the 
war and from reporting on it in an objective manner. They faced significant government pressure 
to report in a way that positively portrayed the Russian war effort. This is illustrated by Thomas 
de Waal’s statement that  
Russian journalists were routinely summoned for interviews in which they were reminded of their 
patriotic duty in reporting the ‘anti-terrorist operation’. Strenuous efforts were made to keep 
foreign correspondents out of the combat zone altogether. Those who went there without proper 
accreditation risked being denied visas, while Moscow-based correspondents were called to the 
Foreign Ministry and reprimanded for their anti-Russian coverage.2 
 
With obstacles such as these, it was difficult for journalists to get accurate information on what 
was happening in the war and to report unbiased facts to the Russian public.  
De Waal illustrated this biased and incomplete coverage with his discussion of a 
massacre in Grozny’s Central Market which had been caused by Russian missiles.3 This event 
was not covered objectively by most Russian media sources. For example pictures were not 
reported, there were denials that the event even occurred, and it was blamed on the Chechen 
rebels.4 Many Russian journalists did not or were not able to cover this event or the war 
objectively. Though some of this bias may have been due to patriotism, it is likely that many 
journalists knew that there would be consequences if they reported in a manner that blamed 
Russian forces and the government for its actions in Chechnya.  
These consequences were exemplified by the firing of Leonid Parfyonov, a journalist 
                                                          
2 Thomas de Waal, introduction to A Dirty War, translated by John Crowfoot, (London: The Harvill Press, 2001), 
xxvi. 
3 Ibid., xxx. 
4 Ibid. 
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from NTV, after he aired an interview with a Chechen rebel leader’s widow.5 It was widely 
speculated that the firing of Parfyonov was politically motivated.6 He was fired because of his 
coverage of the war and the Russian government. The article detailing this event also cited the 
takeover of NTV, which had once been an independent news source, by the government.7 The 
leader of NTV, Vladimir Gusinsky, was forced to flee Russia due to “fraud charges most 
observers said were meant as political punishment for NTV’s sharp-edged coverage.”8 The firing 
of Parfyonov and the takeover of NTV were two of many examples of the dangers of portraying 
the Russian government and its war effort in Chechnya in a bad light. Punishments such as these 
made it clear that negative coverage would not be tolerated unless it was aimed at the Chechen 
side.  
Some of the broader effects of the information battle were illustrated by Rachel Denber 
with Human Rights Watch.9 Denber, in her discussion of the international response to the second 
war in Chechnya, detailed the obstacles the OSCE Assistance Group and Council of Europe 
representatives faced in the documentation of human rights abuses.10 She stated that the Russian 
government made such “prodigious efforts at presenting obstacles” that the OSCE Assistance 
Group faced lengthy delays in deploying to Chechnya after the start of the second war.11 It took 
them more than a year to establish a presence.12 Likewise representatives from the Council of 
                                                          
5 Alex Rodriguez, “Russia Sacks Top TV Journalist After Chechnya Interview: Kremlin Silences Media’s 
Criticism,” June 3, 2004, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-06-03/news/0406030372_1_leonid-parfyonov-ntv-
vladimir-gusinsky. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Rachel Denber, “’Glad to be Deceived’: The International Community and Chechnya,” accessed April 19, 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/7.pdf. 
10 Ibid., 8. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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Europe were unable to travel and investigate in Chechnya without restriction.13 Denber also 
stated that their reports “generally contained little information that could not be found in other 
sources and information on human rights abuses was often of a general nature.”14 Obstacles such 
as these greatly lessened the available knowledge on events and possible abuses during the war, 
the influence of the international community on the conduct of the war, and the degree to which 
international agencies were able to help Chechen non-combatants. The Russian government 
would not allow these agencies to have a role in reporting on the war because this would 
negatively impact how the war was viewed by the Russian public and the international 
community.  
With such heavy handed government influence on media coverage of the war, much of 
the news coming out of Chechnya was biased towards the Russian side. The government wanted 
its story to be believed and was prepared to limit freedom of the press to do so. It was also 
prepared to go against international agencies and to interfere with their efforts to help civilians in 
order to preserve that image. Because of these things the Russian government’s portrayal of the 
war and Chechens had the most impact.  
 
Chechens as Terrorists 
 An integral part of the government’s information battle against the Chechen rebels was 
its portrayal of them as international terrorists. Though terrorism was in fact used as a tactic of 
war by the Chechen rebels, this portrayal was partly motivated by the need of the government to 
justify a second invasion of Chechnya, to erode any potential support for the Chechen rebels, and 
to downplay the rebels’ separatist ambitions. Unfortunately, this label had other, more concrete 
                                                          
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid., 8-9. 
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consequences for Chechen non-combatants as they were often subject to gross human rights 
abuses committed by Russian forces. Strikingly, surveys show that knowledge of these abuses 
did not much affect Russian public opinion on the war and that instead, the government’s 
manipulation and restriction of media was working to not only shield Russians from knowledge 
of the abuses but also to gain support for the fight against terrorism. Finally, the Chechen rebels 
often sought to refute the portrayal of their efforts as motivated by international terrorism and to 
instead emphasize their separatist aims.  
The portrayal of the Chechen rebel movement as one of terrorism is not entirely 
undeserved, even if it fails to capture the true complexities of the rebel side. The rebels, having 
grown sufficiently desperate after suffering major defeats in the first Chechen war, turned more 
and more to using terrorist tactics. The first in a list of major attacks occurred in 1995 when 
forces led by Shamil Basayev attacked the Russian town of Budyonnovsk. Basayev’s goals in 
this attack were to convince the Russian government to withdraw from Chechnya and to begin 
negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides.15 His aims were met with success as 
Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomydrin agreed to halt Russian military actions in 
Chechnya and to begin negotiations if the hostages were released.16 
Through developments such as these in the first Chechen war, the use of terrorism by the 
Chechen rebels was seen in a positive light in Chechnya.17 Though terrorism was and is against 
international law, after the first war it was seen as something heroic because it turned the tide of 
the war and, ultimately, won it for the Chechen side.18 According to Diane Sumner, after the 
                                                          
15 Diane Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, 1999, 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/9039/successofterrori00sumn.pdf?sequence=1, 35.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 60. 
18 Ibid. 
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attack “Shamil Basayev, already previously renowned for his combat leadership skills, was 
elevated to hero status.”19 This and other attacks also served to demoralize Russian citizens and 
“eliminated popular support for Russia’s war effort.”20 This demoralization and the brief 
cessation of hostilities agreed to after Budyonnovsk also caused the Russian army to suffer 
setbacks in their war effort in Chechnya.21 Because the attack and its results were so successful, 
terrorism was deemed an effective tactic and was repeated throughout the first and second 
wars.22 
Importantly, one of the sparks for the second war was the bombing of apartment 
buildings in Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk in September of 1999. These were purportedly 
committed by Chechen terrorists. However, it was widely suspected that the attacks were 
orchestrated by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) as a means to justify a new war. 
According to the French documentary, The Assassination of Russia, an attack in Ryazan was 
foiled and FSB agents were revealed to be the perpetrators. 23 It was later covered up as an FSB 
training exercise.24 Though terrorist tactics were definitely used by the Chechen rebels during the 
first and second war, in this instance it may have been an effort by the Russian government to 
justify the second invasion of Chechnya and to begin to frame the war as one against terrorism. 
After terrorist tactics were used by the Chechen side, the Russian government situated the 
Chechen war effort as part of a wider movement of international terrorism. It often emphasized 
the presence of foreign fighters, foreign support, and international connections to the Chechen 
rebels. This is illustrated by Vladimir Putin’s statement at the start of the second war that “They 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 38.  
20 Ibid., 51.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 60. 
23 Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, The Assassination of Russia, documentary, directed by Jean-Charles 
Deniau and Charles Gazelle (2002; London: Transparences Productions, 2011.), YouTube Video. 
24 Ibid. 
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have to understand that we are not fighting Chechen people, but international terrorism and the 
most violent form of ideological and religious extremism.”25 With this Putin discouraged any 
sympathetic view of the Chechen resistance and justified the war as one against international 
terrorists rather than as a fight against separatism. 
Unfortunately this picture of the war in Chechnya as a fight against terrorism had 
consequences for Chechen non-combatants. In a January 2000 interview with ORT Channel, 
Putin’s interviewer stated that “the generals made some political blunders, for example, when 
they branded all Chechens aged between 10 and 60 as suspected of terrorism.”26 Putin replied 
that this was a necessary measure, if not the best way to find terrorists.27 He stated that they were 
forced to use this broad label because of the constraints of the Russian Criminal Code: “If we 
could detain and arrest people not for two or three days as set out in the Russian Criminal Code, 
but for 10, 20, 30 or 60 days, many things would be different. This is the main reason, and it also 
explains why the statements made by our military are sometimes inaccurate.”28 To further the 
war effort and the war against Chechen terrorism, he was willing to sacrifice Chechen non-
combatants’ rights as Russian citizens. This measure was not in line with international methods 
of dealing with terrorism. For comparison one may examine the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) 2001 “Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism” 
Clause 11 which states:  
Participating States/Permanent Council/ODIHR/High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM)/Representative on Freedom of the Media: Will promote and enhance tolerance, co- 
existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious, linguistic and other groups as well 
as constructive co-operation among participating States in this regard. Will provide early warning 
of and appropriate responses to violence, intolerance, extremism and discrimination against these 
                                                          
25 Vladimir Putin, “Interview with the RTR TV Channel,” President of Russia, January, 23, 2000, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24126. 
26 Vladimir Putin, “Interview with ORT Channel,” President of Russia, January 15, 2000, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24377.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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groups and, at the same time, promote their respect for the rule of law, democratic values and 
individual freedoms. Will work to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities have the 
right freely to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious 
identity.29  
 
This clause outlined ways in which to prevent conditions favorable to the development of 
terrorism by emphasizing tolerance and respect for minority groups that live in OSCE member 
states such as the Russian Federation. The idea that all Chechens between the ages of 10 and 60 
should be suspected of terrorism went directly against Clause 11 as it labeled almost all 
Chechens as terrorists and legitimized any mistreatment of and discrimination against Chechen 
non-combatants, potentially adding fuel to the fire and embittering more Chechen citizens 
against Russia.  
 Further going against international norms, Russia’s general conduct of the war often 
victimized non-combatants. According to Rachel Denber with Human Rights Watch  
Five months of indiscriminate bombing and shelling in 1999 and early 2000 resulted in thousands 
of civilian deaths. Three massacres, which followed combat operations, took the lives of at least 
130 people … Russian forces arbitrarily detain those allegedly suspected of being, or 
collaborating with, rebel fighters and torture them in custody to secure confessions or testimony. 
In some cases, the corpses of those last seen in Russian custody were subsequently found, bearing 
marks of torture and summary execution, in dumping grounds or unmarked graves. More often, 
those last seen in custody are simply never seen again—they have been forcibly disappeared.30 
 
As Denber stated, the victimization of non-combatants was prevalent in the second war. Much of 
this violence against civilians may have been due to the impunity with which Russian forces 
could commit crimes against them. In April 2001 the Russian government illustrated this when it 
“made available a list of criminal investigations related to the Chechnya conflict.”31 Denber 
stated that this list made it clear that many cases were not being investigated or prosecuted in 
                                                          
29 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “The Bucharest Plan of Action for combating terrorism,” 
December 4, 2001, http://www.osce.org/atu/42524. 
30 Rachel Denber, “’Glad to be Deceived’: The International Community and Chechnya,” 3. 
31 Ibid., 8. 
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court and that the government was not investigating accusations of torture.32 Though this 
impunity was no doubt a factor, when confronted with such violence against innocent civilians, 
one must also consider other possible motivations and means of rationalizing the violence. It is 
likely that the label of nearly all Chechen non-combatants as terrorists had some impact in the 
process of normalizing violence against civilians as it legitimized treating them all as potential 
terrorists and rebels even if there was no definitive proof. 
Further illustrating the real-life impacts of this portrayal of the Chechen war effort were 
the many human rights abuses committed by Russian forces during the second war. Human 
Rights Watch outlined many instances in which Chechen non-combatants were “disappeared” 
after Russian forces conducted “sweep operations” in Chechnya to confiscate weapons and to 
find “those believed to be collaborating with Chechen rebels.”33 In one instance two men were 
walking back to their village when they were told that a sweep was occurring there.34 The two 
men waited outside the village while the sweep went on and were detained when two military 
vehicles passed by their location.35 Witnesses stated that “ten or twelve persons in camouflage 
uniforms seized them by the arms and threw them into one of the APCs” and that “the men in 
uniform did not ask any questions and did not check the identity papers of the young men.”36 
Later their dead bodies were discovered in a quarry near the village.37 In another instance, a 
Chechen rebel ran into a courtyard and was shot dead by soldiers.38 Two young Chechen men 
were detained simply for living and being in the courtyard.39 The parents of the two men later 
                                                          
32 Ibid.  
33 “Detention and ‘Disappearance’” in The ”Dirty War” in Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture, and 
Summary Executions, Human Rights Watch, March 2001, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/chechnya/. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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saw a news recording which pictured one of their sons dead and labelled as a Chechen 
commander.40 When the parents pressured the local military for answers regarding their sons’ 
whereabouts, they were given little information.41 Eventually it was revealed through the bribery 
of a military office that both of their sons had been killed and buried in unmarked graves.42 It is 
clear from these examples and the many others detailed in the Human Rights Watch report that 
the guilt of Chechen men of military age was assumed because of the simple fact that they were 
Chechen men of military age. 
The label of the Chechen rebel movement as terrorist in nature and the inclusion of 
almost all Chechens as suspect of terrorism may have greatly impacted Russian conduct of the 
war. The two situations cited above were by no means isolated incidents. Discrimination against 
and the brutal treatment of non-combatants was prevalent. Interestingly however, information on 
these human rights abuses did not much affect Russian public support for the war in Chechnya. 
Instead, people were much more concerned about the threats of terrorism and separatism. In a 
survey representative of Russian public opinion, only 4% of respondents listed “Shame that our 
troops violate human rights and international norms” as something they felt when asked about 
“reports about the activities of federal forces in Chechnya during the last several months.”43 
People were much more concerned with the number of Russian casualties, the cost of the war, 
and the inability of Russian troops to quell the rebels.44 Notably, 12% felt “Pride that Russia is 
fighting terrorism.”45 Though this number is small, it is still three times the number of Russians 
concerned about human rights abuses. In the same survey when participants were asked “How 
                                                          
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson, “How Russians Think about Chechnya,” PONARS Policy Memo 
No. 243, January 2002, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0243.pdf, 3. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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important are the following to your assessment of what’s happening in Chechnya,” only 16% 
said very and 32% said somewhat for the category of “Reports of human rights/international 
norms violations by our troops.”46 In contrast, when responding to “The necessity of the struggle 
against terrorism,” 65% said very and 28% said somewhat.47 Taken together this data shows that 
opposition to the war on the grounds of human rights abuses and the victimization of Chechen 
non-combatants had much less powerful an impact on the Russian public than the Russian 
government’s depiction of Chechens and the aims of the war.48 The authors of the survey 
concluded “that the government’s efforts to define the conflict in terms of national security (the 
war on terrorism, protecting Russia’s territorial integrity, supporting troops) are not only 
effective, but also produce the intended result: this framing increases support for military 
action.”49 The information battle was having the desired impact. 
 After the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States Putin further attempted to 
frame the Chechen conflict as an extension of international terrorism as he sought to situate it 
within the War on Terror. In a speech on the one year anniversary of the attacks in the United 
States, Putin highlighted Shamil Basayev’s links to al-Qaeda.50 He stated that “For a long time 
the source of extremism and terrorism in our country has been the Chechen Republic where 
international terrorist organizations, including notorious al-Qaeda, unfolded their activities on a 
full scale.”51 This effort to situate Chechnya as a part of international terrorism helped create a 
negative image of Chechnya and Chechens in the West.   
 This is highlighted by the lack of any significant international reproach of Russia for its 
                                                          
46 Ibid., 5. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 8. 
49 Ibid., 7. 
50 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at a Meeting of the Heads of Security and Military Agencies,” President of Russia, 
September 11, 2002, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2002/09/11/0000_type82912type82913_151644.shtml.  
51 Ibid.  
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actions in Chechnya after 2001.52 After 2001 international response consisted of actions such as 
the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya failing to reestablish its presence in Chechnya after the 
Russian government discontinued its mandate and sought to strip it of its “human rights and 
political dimensions,” a failed European Union (EU) resolution, and a failed resolution in the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) “to postpone a constitutional 
referendum” in Chechnya due to “escalating conflict and persistence of human rights abuses and 
a poor security environment.”53 Though this weak international response to events in Chechnya 
was prevalent throughout the war, Chechnya’s situation within the War on Terror seems to have 
solidified it.  
 Also displaying the success of Russia’s approach to portraying the second Chechen war 
as one against terrorism was the evolution of the views of President George W. Bush on Russia 
and the war. In a February 2000 interview Jim Lehrer requested Bush’s response to the fact that 
“On Chechnya and Russia the U.S. and the rest of the western world has been raising Cain with 
Russia from the beginning, saying ‘You are killing innocent civilians.’ The Russians have said 
essentially ‘We’re fighting terrorism, and, by the way, mind your own business.’ What else—
what else, if anything, could be done by the United States?” Bush responded by suggesting cuts 
to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) aid to Russia “until they heard the message loud and 
clear” and stated that “Putin … has come to power as a result of Chechnya” and by “handling the 
Chechnya situation in a way that’s not acceptable to peaceful nations.”54  
One may compare this somewhat hard stance on the issue of human rights abuses in 
Chechnya to his statement in November 2001, that “the challenge of terrorism makes our close 
                                                          
52 Rachel Denber, “’Glad to be Deceived’: The International Community and Chechnya,” 1-2. 
53 Ibid., 5. 
54 George W. Bush, interview by Jim Lehrer, PBS News Hour, February 16, 2000, transcript, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-jan-june00-bush_02-16/. 
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cooperation on all issues even more urgent. Russia and America share the same threat and the 
same resolve. We will fight and defeat terrorist networks wherever they exist”55 and that the two 
countries needed to “develop a new strategic framework that enables both of us to meet the true 
threats of the twenty-first century as partners and friends, not as adversaries.”56 And further with 
direct regard to Chechnya that “We are encouraged by President Putin’s commitment to a 
political dialogue in Chechnya.”57 Bush’s approach to the Chechnya question changed 
dramatically after it was situated as part of the fight against international terrorism.  
 
Rebel Response to Portrayals of them as International Terrorists 
 Interestingly, Chechen rebels responded directly to the government’s portrayal of them as 
international terrorists when they sought to reclaim the label. Examining a video released by 
Basayev, a Western journalist stated that  
Shamil Basayev, apparently seeking to make a claim of containing the long-simmering war, 
pledged to refrain from terrorist acts in other nations. ‘We are not planning any attacks outside 
Russia, even though we have the capability to do so,’ he said … ‘We will not even target Russian 
officials who committed massacres against the Chechen people if they are in foreign countries.58 
 
With this statement, Basayev sought to show that the Chechen fighters could not be identified as 
international terrorists because they were not fighting an international war. Later in the article, 
the Western journalist quoted Basayev’s assertion that “we are not planning any operations in 
foreign countries … Unlike the Russians who assassinated our former leader in Qatar.’”59 
Basayev was redirecting the label of international terrorist and applying it to the Russian 
                                                          
55 George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, “The President’s News Conference With President Vladimir Putin of 
Russia,” (news conference, White House, Washington D.C., November 13, 2001), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/youtubeclip.php?clipid=64429&admin=43, 0:49 
56 Ibid., 3:30. 
57 Ibid., 4:50. 
58 C.J. Chivers, “Rebel Leader of Chechens Resurfaces on Videotape,” New York Times, July 4, 2004. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/04/world/rebel-leader-of-chechens-resurfaces-on-videotape.html. 
59 Ibid.  
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government. He fully admitted to using terrorist tactics, but also accused Russia of using those 
same tactics. 
 
The Criminalization of Chechens 
As with the portrayal of the Chechen rebels as terrorists, the portrayal of the rebels as 
criminals was not entirely unwarranted. Crime was quite prevalent in Chechnya after the first 
war. Accordingly, the Russian government capitalized on this and framed the war in Chechnya 
as one meant to fight against crime. This had consequences for Chechen civilians, even those 
who took no part in crime. Ironically, this war against crime also had the effect of creating more 
crime in Chechnya and Russia as it allowed the perpetuation of crime in Chechnya and allowed 
Russian forces who had committed human rights abuses with impunity to return to their jobs far 
more likely to commit those same crimes against Russian civilians. 
After the first Chechen war, Chechnya was faced with many serious problems, one of 
which was the rampant nature of crime. According to James Hughes, “Maskhadov’s government 
simply did not have the capacity to manage these challenges” of “criminality in Chechnya, in 
particular … hostage-taking,” and of reigning in the “many armed groups in Chechnya.”60 
Hostage-taking, ransoming, and assassination had become useful sources of income and also 
served as “retaliation and exchange for the many hundreds of Chechens who were detained by 
Russia in ‘filtration’ camps.”61 Hughes cited a total number of 506 hostage-taking cases.62 This 
lends credibility to one BBC journalist’s statement in 1999 that “Chechnya has earned itself the 
                                                          
60 James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 2007), 
96. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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unenviable label of kidnap capital of the world.”63 Indeed, lawlessness in Chechnya continued to 
the point that one warlord, Basayev, was able to raise an army and invade the neighboring 
republic of Dagestan. This was a spark for the start of the second Chechen war.  
As it was one of the sparks for the second war, it makes sense that crime in Chechnya 
was often used to justify a second invasion. Hughes outlines how Putin’s security service 
background may have contributed to his approach to problem-solving in Chechnya.64 He stated 
that  
Putin would have been party to the argument of the ‘power ministries,’ best exemplified publicly 
by former minister of defense Kulikov, which repeated the mantra-like formula that Chechnya 
was ungovernable, a ‘bandit’ and ‘terrorist’ state, increasingly dominated by fanatical Wahhabis 
and intent on wider destabilization in the North Caucasus … According to this script, Russia’s de 
facto recognition of independence for Chechnya only served to promote further chaos and the 
growth of ‘terrorism.’65 
 
Indeed, this was the course that Putin’s rhetoric regarding crime in Chechnya took. In his 2000 
“Open Letter to Voters,” Putin portrayed Chechnya as a haven for criminals.66 He stated that “A 
whole constituent republic of the Russian Federation, Chechnya, was taken over by the criminal 
world and turned into its fortress.”67 He then asserted that because of Russia’s successes in the 
war, criminals “can no longer look to assistance from or find shelter in Chechnya. A terrible 
blow has been dealt to the world of bandits.”68 In this “Open Letter” Putin treated the war in 
Chechnya as part of his war on crime in Russia and made Chechnya appear as one of the chief 
sources of criminality in Russia.69 Notably, this statement also failed to distinguish between 
Chechen civilians and criminals. Because he said that criminals found refuge in Chechnya, Putin 
                                                          
63 “Russian Deadline Over Chechen Kidnap,” BBC, March 7, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/292251.stm. 
64 James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, 107. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Vladimir Putin, “Open Letter to Voters,” President of Russia, February 25, 2000, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/24144.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
16 
 
made it seem as if all Chechens were susceptible to and welcoming of criminal activity.  
Illustrating the impact of the portrayal of Chechnya as a criminal nation on average 
Chechen civilians was Politkovskaya’s story of Arslan Gatiev, a man from Daghestan who was 
living in Moscow at the start of the second war.70 When re-registering his documents, he was 
detained by the police and heroin was planted on his person.71 One of the officers informed him 
that “We have a slogan now: ‘Chechnya for the Chechens.’ Go back to your own country.”72 The 
policemen wished to detain Chechens and stated that “while we’re at war with Chechnya, we 
must put you all in prison.”73 Though Arslan had done nothing wrong, he was labeled a criminal 
and put in prison for simply being from the North Caucasus. He wasn’t even Chechen, but felt 
the impact of this label. 
A child’s essay on their homeland recorded by Politkovskaya also reveals the impact that 
criminalization had on Chechen civilians.74 The child stated that “The soldiers from Russia are 
killing children, our sisters and brothers. They say they are bandits. But they are not bandits, they 
are defending the homeland.”75 This not only reveals the child’s perception of the war as one 
against a Russian invader but also highlights the injustice the child feels at the Russian forces’ 
excuses for victimizing non-combatants. It is clear that even children felt the burden of this label 
and its consequences.  
Ironically, while purporting to be countering criminality in the whole of Russia by 
pursuing war in Chechnya, by failing to pursue violations of human rights by Russian forces in 
Chechnya, Russia not only embittered more Chechens against Russia, but also allowed the “Tens 
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of thousands of police and security forces” who “have done tours of duty in Chechnya” to return 
home unpunished and more likely to mistreat Russian civilians in police custody.76 This has been 
dubbed Chechen syndrome a phenomenon “among police who served in Chechnya—a particular 
pattern of physical abuse and other dehumanizing treatment of people in custody.”77 Denber 
stated that this Chechen syndrome was  “undermining efforts to promote the rule of law in 
Russia’s criminal justice system.”78 Though the Russian government portrayed its efforts in 
Chechnya as a war against crime, the actual effects of the war were just the opposite. The 
experience of law enforcement officers who fought in Chechnya, having been allowed to commit 
human rights abuses with impunity, may have caused them to believe it was acceptable to 
commit those crimes in Russia.  
Denber’s assertions are supported by an article by Radio Free Europe which quotes 
Sergei Yushenkov as saying that “‘Everybody [serving in the war] understands that unlawful 
actions are allowed in Chechnya, and they can't understand why this sort of behavior should be 
forbidden here [in Moscow, or] in other Russian cities and villages.’"79 The brutal war in 
Chechnya and the lack of justice and proper conduct during it set a dangerous precedent for the 
Russian security forces that served there. 
Similarly, a full scale war and the devastation of Chechnya were not the best methods to 
combat crime there. If anything, it allowed for the perpetuation of crime. In an interview with 
Politkovskaya, Said Magomedov, head of the trade union committee at a factory in Grozny, 
stated that “the authorities don’t realize that without jobs there’s no way of saving Chechnya. 
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The plant must work and that will be the best cure for banditry.”80 He realized that the war in 
Chechnya had done nothing to stymie crime rates and that without the presence of legitimate 
sources of income, the prevalence of crime would never decrease and lives would never return to 
normal. 
 
Chechens as Separatists  
Throughout the second Chechen war many journalists portrayed the Chechen fighters as 
separatists. The Chechen fighters themselves almost always cited their separatist credentials and 
aspirations. Conversely, the Russian government categorically denied that the rebel movement 
was one of separatism and instead stated that it was only a clever front for international 
terrorism. 
Many Western journalists seem to have striven for neutrality in their discussions of the 
second Chechen war and may consequently have portrayed the Chechen rebels as separatists. 
One example of this is a June 2001 article in The Washington Post which focused on the lives of 
civilians during the conflict. This focus may have put the journalist directly opposed to the 
Russian government’s labels of Chechens as terrorists and criminals. She quotes Stanislav 
Ilyasov, Chechnya’s prime minister, as referring to the rebels as “armed criminals in camouflage 
and masks.”81 She then goes on to describe the consequences of these labels by stating that 
“Chechen civilians… are subject to roundups by Russian troops and risk summary execution if 
they cannot convince them they are not rebels. Teachers complain that schoolboys can't even 
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come to class without fear of arrest.”82 This may be the reason that throughout the article the 
journalist only referred to the Chechen fighters as “secessionist rebels”, “guerrillas”, “militants”, 
and “rebels.”83 Instead of reinforcing the negative labels put forth by the Russian government, 
the journalist chose to use the more neutral label of the rebels as separatists. 
Another example of this is a 2003 article in The Times which labeled the Chechen 
fighters as “rebels”, “militants”, and “separatists.”84 These labels seemed intentional as the 
article discussed several different terrorist attacks but never referred to the Chechen rebels as 
terrorists. Interestingly, the journalist also never called the Moscow Theater attack a terrorist 
attack, though it is commonly referred to as one. He only referred to it as the “theatre siege in 
Moscow last year” and “the storming of the theatre”.85 With this and his neutral labels of the 
Chechen fighters, the journalist seemed to intentionally emphasize the separatist nature of the 
Chechen forces rather than their use of terrorist tactics. Though this and the article mentioned 
above represent only two examples of journalists referring to the rebel movement as one of 
separatism, there are many more instances of this and it seemed to be one of the most common 
ways of referring to the rebels.  
 The rhetoric of journalists was in line with what many Chechen fighters thought of 
themselves and their goals. This is evidenced by Politkovskaya’s interview with Lema and 
Ruslan, two Chechen fighters. This interview revealed what some Chechen fighters thought 
about their role in the war and their motivations for fighting. Lema stated that “I am liberating 
my country from enemies and infidels. I see Chechnya as a free Islamic republic, and want it to 
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become one.”86 With this statement he affirmed that he saw himself as a separatist and a 
defender of his nation against a Russian invader.   
Conversely, the Russian government almost always framed the rebels’ claims of 
separatism as a lie meant to gain the support of the West. Putin stated in a January 2000 
interview with RTR TV Channel that “they disguise their ambitious terrorist plans under the 
cover of a fight for national independence.”87 In this quote Putin refuted the rebels’ and media’s 
assertions that the Chechen rebels were separatists. He did this to justify the war and delegitimize 
the rebels. By framing them as criminals and terrorists rather than as separatists, the government 
was also able to fight back at any international support for the rebels.  
 
Chechens as Normal People 
Chechen citizens, the Western media, and the Russian government have all at times and 
for various reasons tried to portray Chechens as normal people. These definitions of “normal” 
differ greatly and could obscure what Chechens might believe to be a normal Chechen identity. 
Chechens and Western media tried to make Chechens appear as a people who only wished for 
peace, while the Russian government tended to define Chechen normality by willingness to 
collaborate with the Russian government’s plans for Chechnya.   
Disappointingly, Chechen sources such as autobiographies and journals are scant. 
Frequently, the only instances of Chechen voice that can be found are in the newspaper articles 
and books of Western and Russian journalists. Thus, my discussion of Chechen sources is 
intertwined with that of Western media sources. Though problematic, because the Chechen voice 
is filtered through another source with its own motives and biases, these sources still highlight 
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what Chechen civilians might have experienced and show how they might have wished to be 
portrayed. 
One such source is a 2001 article which emphasized the impact of the war on Chechen 
civilians.88 By choosing to focus on the fear and danger present in the daily lives of Chechen 
civilians, the journalist presented Chechens as a people who only wished for peace. This was 
evidenced by an interview with Marian Iskhabov who stated that "‘Our biggest need is that this 
war is over. We will be able to live …We just want this to stop.’"89 With this article, the author 
showed that Chechens only wanted the peace and safety required to carry on their lives as normal 
human beings.  
This need for normality was also highlighted by Politkovskaya’s interview with a steel 
worker who told her “I want to make steel, like I’ve been doing for the last 25 years. Tell that to 
Moscow. I’m no bandit. There’s nothing I want apart from to make steel again, and then go 
home, tired after a day’s work.”90 He wanted the world to know that he was just a normal person 
who wanted to live a normal life.  
The Russian government took a very different approach to portraying Chechen normality. 
In a 2004 discussion of the assassination of Akhmat Kadyrov, Putin asserted that “In everything 
he [Kadyrov] did he showed in the most convincing fashion that there can be no equating an 
entire people with bandits and terrorists.”91 This distinction between the rebels and civilians is 
interesting because Akhmat Kadyrov was not only an ex-rebel leader but also a person who rose 
to power in the new Chechen government through collaboration with Russia. This shows that 
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anyone who cooperated with the Russian forces and government was viewed as an upstanding, 
normal citizen and that anyone who did not risked being branded as “bandits and terrorists.”92 
With this statement, Putin asserted that only those Chechens willing to collaborate with the new 
regime would be considered normal.  
 
Chechens as Helpless 
 The Russian government also often stated that Chechen civilians were being harmed by 
the criminal and extremist nature of the Chechen government and rebels in order to justify the 
war. In January 2000, Putin justified intervention in Chechnya as the liberation of the Chechen 
people.93 He did this by asserting that Chechens lived under constant fear of the rebels and the 
Chechen government.94 Putin stated that Russia, “upon the completion of the main or armed 
stage of the operation, will be tasked with restoring peaceful life step by step, and most important 
of all, to free people from the fear in which they have lived for many years.”95 Likewise, Putin 
suggested that when Western representatives “go to the scene and meet the local population, 
when they have a better idea of what is going on … change their opinion about the essence of 
these events.”96 Here, Putin was saying that Chechen civilians needed the war and that if only 
one spoke to a Chechen civilian, one would be impressed by their support for the war.97 
Similarly, in a February 2000 speech, Putin proclaimed that “our sacred duty is to help them 
regain their statehood and restore order in their land.”98 This meant that not only were Chechens 
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the helpless victims of their government, but that they were dependent on Russia to save them 
from their plight. This label of helplessness was a clear attempt to justify the Russian invasion of 
Chechnya.   
 Similarly, in his interview with Politkovskaya, Akhmat Kadyrov stated that as head of a 
provisional Chechen government appointed by Putin his “task is to save the Chechen nation from 
the path that it has repeatedly been deceived into following for the last 300-400 years.”99 Here 
Kadyrov highlighted international ties to Chechen rebel movements, those in the past and current 
ones, and said that though he himself had been deceived into following those ways, he had 
realized the right path—to be part of Russia—for the Chechen people and would steer them in 
that direction.100 This statement sought to reinforce the conception of the Chechen people as 
helpless victims of the intrigues of international terrorists that needed to be saved by the Russian 
government and its war in Chechnya.  
 These assertions of Chechen helplessness and the necessity of war become absurd when 
one considers that the Russian government was suggesting brutal, devastating warfare as the only 
solution to the criminalization and radicalization that had occurred in Chechnya. When this is 
taken into consideration, it is clear that this label was only used to justify a second invasion of 
Chechnya and to gain popular support for the war. 
 
Conclusions: 
 The information battle made it so that any opposition to the government’s portrayal of 
Chechens and the war in Chechnya such as illustrations of human rights abuses and the portrayal 
of Chechens as normal Russian citizens and as people who just wanted peace had very little 
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impact on the Russian public support for the war. The story put forth by the government that the 
Chechen rebels were dangerous criminals and terrorists that needed to be defeated at all costs 
was accepted. Likewise, the rebels’ claims to separatism did nothing to lessen the ire against 
them and only fueled fears people had about the possible disintegration of the Russian 
Federation. The impact of this portrayal of the war on Chechen non-combatants was 
overwhelmingly negative. It created a stigma against Chechen citizens and allowed Russian 
forces in Chechnya to victimize Chechen non-combatants with impunity. There is no doubt that 
the Russian government won the information battle. 
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